Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 72

Issue 1

Article 12

Winter 1-1-2015

The Prior Convictions Exception—A Comment
Matthew Engle
Washington and Lee University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Matthew Engle, The Prior Convictions Exception—A Comment, 72 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 473
(2015).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol72/iss1/12
This Student Notes Colloquium is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review
at Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

The Prior Convictions Exception—A
Comment
Matthew Engle
Ms. Sawyer makes a compelling case that prior convictions
should continue to be treated differently than other facts that
affect the duration of a criminal sentence and therefore must be
treated as elements in a criminal prosecution.1 As she correctly
notes, many judges and prosecutors have argued in favor of
upholding the Almendarez-Torres exception2 because requiring
the prosecution to prove past convictions to the jury could create
prejudice against a recidivist defendant.3 Some skepticism is
merited when the government seeks to lighten its own burden out
of supposed concern for the welfare of those defendants whose
foolhardy reluctance to waive their constitutional rights might
prejudice them. Equally dubious are government protestations
that the criminal justice system will grind to a halt if sentencing
juries are required to protect the rights of criminal defendants.4
Nevertheless, one can support the rule of Almendarez-Torres
without suspending disbelief about the benevolent nature of
 Visiting Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University and
Director of the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse.
1. See Meg E. Sawyer, The Prior Convictions Exception: Examining the
Continuing Viability of Almendarez-Torres Under Alleyne, 72 WASH. & LEE. L.
REV. 409, 413 (2015) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court should not overturn
the prior convictions exception of the Sixth Amendment).
2. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226–27 (1998)
(finding that sentence-enhancing factor based on a prior conviction is a penalty
provision rather than a separate crime).
3. See, e.g., Sawyer, supra note 1, at 455 (“Herein lies one of the
inescapable criticisms surrounding habitual-offender systems and consequently,
one of the primary reasons to uphold Almendarez-Torres—prejudice to the
defendant.”); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 38 (2005) (“[T]oday’s hint at
extending the Apprendi rule to the issue of . . . prior crimes surely will do no
favors for future defendants . . . .”).
4. Cf. Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 1467, 1491–96 (2001) (noting how many state legislatures have redrafted
criminal statutes in light of Apprendi to reduce the burdens imposed on
prosecutors).
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prosecutors or the fragility of a justice system that will crumble
under its own weight if the tiny fraction of prosecutions that
actually go to trial are bifurcated into merits and sentencing
phases.5 The fact remains that prior convictions are
fundamentally different than other “sentencing factors” that the
Apprendi revolution has recast as elements of greater offenses.6
Unlike other facts, a prior conviction reflects a determination by
the criminal justice system that we have arrived at the truth of a
matter through adversarial testing. We imbue criminal
convictions with finality because we can be confident, absent
proof to the contrary, that we arrived at the conclusion that the
defendant was guilty of the prior crime despite affording him all
of the constitutional safeguards to which he was entitled. In other
words, it is unnecessary to require a jury to find a prior
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt because either another jury
has already done so or the defendant has waived his right to a
jury determination of his guilt.7
Indeed, it would make little sense to invite subsequent juries
to revisit the judicially determined fact of the defendant’s guilt. It
is not difficult to imagine the problems that might arise if the
prosecution was required to reprove the defendant’s guilt of
crimes of which he had already been convicted whenever it
wished to enhance a subsequent sentence.8 What would be the
effect of a second jury’s determination that the defendant was not
guilty for a crime of which he had previously been convicted?
5. It is worth noting that, in the death penalty context, bifurcated and
even trifurcated trials have become the norm. See, e.g., United States v. Umaña,
750 F.3d 320, 333 (4th Cir. 2014) (discussing North Carolina courts’ trifurcated
death penalty process). These procedural safeguards do not seem to have caused
any massive disruption in the federal government’s efforts to obtain death
sentences.
6. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
7. See Garrus v. Sec’y of Pa. Dept. of Corr., 694 F.3d 394, 400 (3d Cir.
2012) (stating that a prior conviction has already been established through
procedural safeguards, such as fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial
guarantees).
8. See Sawyer, supra note 1, at 455–56 (discussing two troublesome
options prosecutors would face if required to prove prior convictions beyond a
reasonable doubt).
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Would a second jury’s determination of innocence foreclose the
government from relying on that same conviction to enhance the
penalty in a later prosecution? There is no compelling reason to
invite these questions when the prosecution has already been
held to its burden of establishing the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt in an earlier proceeding.9
From the defense perspective, the problem with AlmendarezTorres arises because the government is rarely satisfied to do
what the prior convictions exception permits it to do. That is, the
government is almost never content to prove “the fact of a prior
conviction.” In cases where recidivism is at issue, what the
government actually wants to do is provide the sentencer with
prejudicial facts regarding the defendant’s alleged conduct in
committing the prior crime. But to do so, the government
frequently must prove facts beyond the judicially determined fact
that the defendant was previously convicted of a particular crime.
For example, in Shepard v. United States,10 the government
sought to enhance the defendant’s sentence under the Armed
Career Criminal Act (ACCA),11 which mandates a fifteen-year
minimum sentence for anyone possessing a firearm after three
convictions of violent felonies.12 At issue in Shepard was whether
the defendant’s previous burglary convictions in Massachusetts,
entered upon guilty pleas, constituted violent felonies.13 The
Court had previously concluded that only burglaries into
buildings or structures (as opposed to vehicles) constituted
violent felonies within the meaning of the ACCA.14 But because
Massachusetts permitted burglary convictions for unauthorized
entries into buildings, structures, or vehicles, it was not clear
9. See Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 547 U.S. 1201, 1201 (2006) (arguing
that judicial determination of a defendant’s prior criminal history “will seldom
create any significant risk of prejudice to the accused”).
10. 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).
12. Id.
13. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 15–16 (noting that the ACCA makes burglary
a violent felony only if committed in a building or enclosed space).
14. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990) (“[A] person has
been convicted of burglary for purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement if he is
convicted of any crime . . . having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged
entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a
crime.”).
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whether the defendant’s prior burglaries qualified.15 Accordingly,
the government argued that the Court should consider police
reports related to the prior charges, which allegedly would have
shown that the defendant did feloniously enter a building or
structure.16
The Shepard Court rightly rejected this approach, noting
that permitting proof of facts at the subsequent trial beyond
those that necessarily must have been found to obtain the prior
conviction would violate congressional intent and, arguably, the
Sixth Amendment.17 In so holding, the Court relied heavily on its
earlier decision in Taylor v. United States,18 where it had held
that the government was limited to introducing “conclusive
records made or used in adjudicating guilt,” including the
charging documents and other “recorded judicial acts of the
court,” such as jury instructions that required specific factual
findings to convict.19 But the Court did not stop there. In a case
such as Shepard, involving prior guilty pleas, the Court opined
that these “conclusive records” could also include a transcript of
the prior plea colloquy containing a statement of the factual basis
for the charge.20 Thus, while correctly rejecting the government’s
attempt to rely on hearsay police reports, the Shepard Court, in
dicta, appears to have expanded the universe of records on which
the government may rely to establish the facts of prior offenses.21
15. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16 (noting that states often define burglary
more broadly than does the ACCA).
16. Id. at 17.
17. Id. at 19–23.
18. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
19. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 20–21 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602).
20. See id. at 16 (holding that prosecution may not rely on police reports to
establish that a burglary was a violent felony under the ACCA).
21. Other courts have similarly permitted sentencing courts to consider
plea colloquy transcripts and other documents to determine the facts of prior
offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 91 F.3d 114, 116 (11th Cir. 1996)
(permitting the district court to consider presentence reports to ascertain the
facts underlying the defendant’s prior guilty pleas in state court); United States
v. Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320, 322 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (statutory elements of
the crime); United States v. Harris, 964 F.2d 1234, 1236 (1st Cir. 1992)
(presentence reports); United States v. Strahl, 958 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir.
1992) (statutory definitions); United States v. Garza, 921 F.2d 59, 61 (5th Cir.
1991) (indictments), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 825 (1991); United States v. Taylor,
932 F.2d 703, 708 (8th Cir. 1991) (statutory elements of the crime), cert. denied,
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It is difficult to reconcile this expansion with the Apprendi
line of Sixth Amendment holdings.22 While upholding
Almendarez-Torres for the reasons given by Ms. Sawyer, the
Court should nevertheless resist the government’s efforts to
expand that decision to include additional facts beyond the mere
fact of a prior conviction. In seeking to enhance sentences based
on prior convictions under the Almendarez-Torres exception, the
government should be limited to the record of conviction and
statutory elements of the offense.23 In particular, the Court
should reject the so-called “pragmatic” approach of permitting the
government to prove to a judge the facts of a prior crime to which
the defendant has pled guilty when those facts have never been
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or even been subjected
to confrontation by the defendant. Because the overwhelming
number of criminal prosecutions are resolved by guilty pleas,
inviting the government to end-run the Sixth Amendment in such
cases would create a far more burdensome problem than the
implementation of sentencing juries if even a small fraction of
defendants who would otherwise plead guilty would insist on
going to trial. At the very least, fairness would require giving the
defendant who wished to enter a guilty plea the opportunity to
contest the government’s proffer of the factual basis of the charge.
In United States v. Santiago,24 another expansive view of the
Almendarez-Torres exception was espoused by then-Judge of the
Second Circuit Sonia Sotomayor. At issue in Santiago was
whether the defendant’s three prior convictions had occurred on
different occasions, such that they could be considered separate
offenses for purposes of applying the mandatory minimum

502 U.S. 882 (1991); United States v. Sweeten, 933 F.2d 765, 769–71 (9th Cir.
1991) (statutory definitions); United States v. Gallman, 907 F.2d 639, 645 n.7
(7th Cir. 1990) (jury instructions), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 908 (1991).
22. Indeed, concurring in the Shepard judgment, Justice Thomas urged the
Court to seize the next opportunity to overrule Almendarez-Torres. Shepard v.
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26–28 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Maness, 23 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir. 1994)
(Ryan, J., concurring) (stating that it is “inappropriate . . . to look to the facts
underlying the defendant’s prior burglary convictions in order to decide whether
those crimes are violent felonies for the purpose of enhancing the defendant’s
sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act”).
24. 268 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2001).
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sentence codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012).25 In Judge
Sotomayor’s view, the prior convictions exception permitted the
sentencing judge to make “many subsidiary findings, not the least
of which is that the defendant being sentenced is the same
defendant who was previously convicted.”26 Accordingly, Judge
Sotomayor read Apprendi as leaving to the sentencing judge not
only the task of finding the mere fact of prior convictions but also
“other related issues,” including the “who, what, when, and
where” of the prior conviction.27 Thus, while declining to state
whether the Almendarez-Torres exception applied to all issues
related to recidivism, Judge Sotomayor held that the
separateness of the prior offenses was merely a sentencing factor
that could be determined by the court rather than a jury.
The Supreme Court should reject the premise of Santiago. In
that case, the Second Circuit reasoned that, because a sentencing
judge would routinely be required to make “many subsidiary
findings” regarding a prior conviction, the Almendarez-Torres
exception should be applied broadly.28 But despite this assertion
of “many subsidiary findings,” the Santiago court provided only a
single example: that the subsequent sentencing court would be
required to find that the defendant was the same person who had
actually been convicted in the earlier prosecution.29 But this
cannot seriously be called a “subsidiary fact;” if the AlmendarezTorres exception means anything, surely it means that any fact,
other than the fact of a prior conviction of this defendant, must be
proven to a jury. It requires quite an analytical leap to conclude
that, because the language “the fact of a prior conviction”
includes a finding that this was the defendant who was
previously convicted, it must also permit judicial determination of
the “who, what, when, and where” of the prior conviction.
Furthermore, the Santiago court made no effort to explain why, if
the identity of the defendant as the former convict was contested,
the state should not be required to convince a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt of this rather significant fact.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 152.
Id. at 156.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Fortunately, as the rule of Apprendi has been reinforced by
subsequent Supreme Court decisions, the Santiago view—that all
facts related to recidivism may be shoe-horned into the
Almendarez-Torres exception—has been increasingly rejected.
Sitting en banc, the Third Circuit recently granted a habeas
petition and found Pennsylvania’s application of its own threestrikes law to be an unreasonable application of Apprendi. In
Garrus v. Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections,30
the habeas petitioner challenged a judicial determination that his
prior offense had involved burglarizing an occupied building
when in fact he had pled guilty to second-degree burglary, an
offense that under Pennsylvania law necessarily involved
burglarizing an unoccupied building.31 In concluding that the
defendant had actually entered an occupied building, the
sentencing court had relied on police reports and a victim’s
statement.32 Granting the habeas petition and vacating the
enhanced sentence, the Third Circuit stated that the prior crimes
exception “is not a panacea allowing recidivism-related judicial
fact-finding,” and recognized Almendarez-Torres as a “‘limited’
and ‘narrow’ exception to the Apprendi rule,” which rests at least
partially on the procedural safeguards that had already attached
to the fact of the prior conviction, including fair notice of the
allegations, the right to a jury trial, and the beyond reasonable
doubt standard.33
Ms. Sawyer’s Note urges the Court to confirm the viability of
the Almendarez-Torres exception, and I agree with this position.
However, the Court should also clarify that the prior crimes
exception neither swallows the rule nor opens the door to judicial
fact-finding of any recidivism-related issues. If the prosecution
wishes to allege facts regarding prior convictions that go beyond
the actual fact of conviction and the statutory elements that were
necessarily established to obtain that conviction, then those
additional facts should be treated as elements. The government
must provide notice of those allegations and prove them to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.
30.
31.
32.
33.

694 F.3d 394 (2d Cir. 2012) (en banc).
Id. at 396.
See id. at 398 (discussing the decision of the sentencing court).
Id. at 406.

